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Rosi Braidotti argues that late postmodern, postindustrial society has a fascination with 
borderline figures, situating such formations in the context of an increasingly technologized 
cultural climate where "classical iconographic representations of monstrous others" cross-
over and mutate with contemporary techno-cultural artifacts ("Teratologies" 157). Typical of 
the popular cultural trend toward the freakish, alien, and mutant is goth-rocker Marilyn 
Manson. As depicted on the cover of the 1998 album Mechanical Animals, Manson embodies 
the fusion of the organic and the machinic.[1] Here Manson is a digital construct - a distended, 
artificial, and posthuman body that eschews the natural. The smooth contours of his seamless, 
plastic flesh betray the familiarity of the organic body. This malleable sheath of rubbery skin 
stretches firmly, yet comfortably, over a figuration that is neither male nor female, biological 
nor technological. 
This article reconsiders feminism's affinity with the monstrous Other through an analysis of 
the Manson figuration.[2] I argue that posthuman forms such as Manson create new 
possibilities for feminist engagements with subjecthood that exceed dialectical thought, 
residing beyond an identification with the monstrous Other. Neither organism nor machine, 
Manson destabilizes the status of the image as representing either self or Other, displacing 
this binary in favour of the ambiguity of a transitional state that defies a natural order. It is 
through his status as a digital simulacrum that Manson erases difference, eroding the 
self/Other distinctions that the monster simultaneously refutes and upholds. In what Jean 
Baudrillard terms a catastrophic process (Fatal Strategies), this disavowal of difference 
operates to occasion a range of differences beyond an economy of dialectics that upholds a 
politics of identity. 
In many respects, posthuman figurations such as Manson may be situated within the 
genealogy of monstrous and mythical forms - the centaurs of classical myth, Francisco Goya's 
ghoulish depiction of Saturn devouring one of his children, and Max Ernst's surrealist man-
bird creation. One of the defining features of the Mechanical Animals sleeve notes centrefold 
is Manson's metamorphosis into a hybrid of animal, human, and machine. Most striking is the 
transformation of Manson's lower limbs into pincer-like hoofs that define him as the 
"Mechanical Animal" of the CD title. Clumsy and cartoonish in their presentation, these 
bovine appendages challenge the integrity of the organic body, teasing and taunting the 
viewer to make something of Manson's morphogenesis into animal. Like many other 
boundary creatures, Manson signals a breakdown in the system of meaning that programs the 
distinctions between animal and human, organism and machine. 
The posthuman, like the monster, is a boundary figure that occupies potentially contradictory 
discourses and signifies "potentially contradictory meanings" (Braidotti, "Signs of Wonder 
and Traces of Doubt" 135). It is this ambiguity that typifies the monster, eliciting anxieties 
concerning the boundaries and borders of the body. Monsters simultaneously threaten and 
uphold the integrity of the human, serving as a deviant category or marginal extreme through 
which the limits of normal, natural, human identity are defined and secured. Various theorists 
have observed that the monster functions both as Other to the normalized self, and as a third 
state or hybrid entity that disrupts subject constitution understood in terms of hierarchical 
binary dualisms (Braidotti, "Signs of Wonder" 141; Cohen 7; Shildrick 78). Part feline, part 
bovine, part hominid, Manson is one such hybrid form. Resplendent with red glowing eyes, a 
metallic sheen, and elongated fingers, he invokes the terror and fascination of the alien-
vampire-monster. As a boundary figure who resists classification within the natural order of 
things, Manson may accordingly be located within the field of teratology - the scientific 
discourse of monsters. 
In a reclamation of the association between the monstrous and the feminine Other, feminist 
revisionist projects have indicated the ways in which monster discourse offers productive and 
subversive means of challenging humanist subjecthood. In Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment 
and Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory, Braidotti associates the organic monster 
with maternal powers of desire and imagination. Against the perception of the monster as an 
anomaly or freak of nature to be derided, monstrosity is reinterpreted as a site of wonder and 
fascination that challenges a masculine symbolic order (85). In this schema, the efficacy of 
the monster lies in its constitution as a feminist metaphor for difference that threatens to 
disrupt phallogocentric models of selfhood, reclaiming Otherness as a site of female subject 
identification. 
Yet the artifice of Manson's posthuman, post-gender formulation corrupts the sanctity of the 
organic monster celebrated by Braidotti. More akin to Donna Haraway's cyborg ("A 
Manifesto for Cyborgs"), Manson emerges from a culture of increasingly prolific technology 
in everyday life, constituted at the site where the material and the mechanical collapse. 
Haraway has suggested that the monsters of technoscientific worlds may offer the promise of 
new and productive affiliations between the feminine, the non-human and the technological 
("The Promise of Monsters" 327). Despite the kinship Manson shares with the techno-hybrid, 
I propose that he cannot be seamlessly accommodated within a feminist formulation of the 
inorganic Other. While the cyborg and the monster operate as identificatory figures through 
which women may better understand the self in the context of changing technologies, the 
posthuman is mobilized as a figure that disavows identity. The posthuman body, as Judith 
Halberstam and Ira Livingstone explain, 
is not monstrous simply by virtue of its status as a non-species: posthuman monstrosity and its 
bodily forms are recognizable because they occupy the overlap between the now and then, the 
here and the always: the annunciation of posthumanity is always both premature and old 
news. (3)  
Baudrillard makes the point that in a simulation culture overrun by the speed and proliferation 
of digital technology, our experience of being a subject is fundamentally altered. 
Postmodernism's fractured and dispersed subject in crisis no longer suffices as a model 
through which to articulate subjective experience. Instead, for Baudrillard the subject is 
understood more appropriately in terms of catastrophe. Catastrophe is the excess, 
acceleration, and precipitation typified by contemporary society. Its potency resides in the 
unmaking of the subject and the triumph of the object. By rendering all difference obsolete, 
this catastrophic subject threatens a politics of identity dependent on self/Other relations, 
disturbing feminist readings of the ideological construction of the monster and cyborg as 
strategic Others in the service of a feminist identity politic. Figuring Manson as a catastrophic 
subject offers a mode of engaging with posthuman figurations beyond the limits of monster 
theory.  
Underpinning an engagement with posthuman, post-gender entities is a shift in relations 
between the real and representation within an economy of simulation. According to Katherine 
Hayles, the posthuman can be understood as unfolding along an axis of multiple cultural and 
technical locations, emerging from complex, highly specialized discourses such as artificial 
intelligence, virtual reality, and biotechnology, as well as popular culture sites including 
science fiction literature and popular film (247). This confusion of categories through which 
the posthuman emerges reflects the postmodern breakdown of the divide between high and 
low cultural forms, signaling the intermixing of biotechnological narratives with science 
fiction fantasy. This, of course, is the order of the hyperreal - a Baudrillardian concept 
understood as the point where fact and fantasy are no longer distinguishable (Simulacra and 
Simulation 212). As the distinctions between autonomous spheres no longer hold, the 
production of meaning within particular categories and genres is made impossible. Meaning 
instead resides in multiple locations, beyond the fixity of signifying practice.  
The collapse in the distinction between scientific fact and science fiction fantasy thus forces 
another mode of engagement with images of the monstrous, for when highly specific fields of 
knowledge and specialized discursive practices, such as biotechnology, converge and 
intermix with popular cultural sites, representations demand to be negotiated differently. 
Approaching the image in terms of simulation ruptures finite distinctions between what is real 
and what is illusion. By contesting a value system predicated upon binary difference, 
simulation encourages fluid, contradictory, and partial engagements with images, 
complicating a model of the self as either entirely resisting or complying with particular 
aspects of culture. As a product of simulation culture, the posthuman figuration has no Other, 
no referent from which to constitute the self. Manson's image on the CD is not a 
representation of Manson in "real life." Rather, Manson here is a simulacrum, unhinging the 
dichotomy between self and Other, original and representation. There is no "original" Manson 
to be located outside of the image. While the monstrous inhuman of ancient myth retains the 
Otherness of alienation, remaining locked in a dialectical relationship with the self, the 
posthuman figuration cannot be contained in such terms. Otherness disappears in a culture of 
simulation, Baudrillard argues, "when all becomes transparence and immediate visibility, 
when everything is exposed to the harsh and inexorable light of information and 
communication" ("The Ecstasy of Communication" 130). 
Where Baudrillard speaks of the transparency of the subject, he refers to the moment when 
electronic media and communication proliferate and accelerate to the point where the subject 
is no longer visible in the relay of information. Not only does the subject disappear in a 
hyperreal cacophony of visual signs and information overload, the social system is said to 
exceed its limit point, to approach an ecstatic state through the endless proliferation of 
information and signs. Baudrillard observes that: 
Things have found a way of avoiding a dialectics of meaning that was beginning to bore 
them: by proliferating indefinitely, increasing their potential, outbidding themselves in an 
ascension to the limit, an obscenity that henceforth becomes their immanent finality and 
senseless reason. (Fatal Strategies 7)  
By exploring what resides beyond the extremities of the social, Baudrillard is attempting to 
pass from a dialectical system of interpretation into a space where referential values are 
impossible. It is at this point of saturation by the precession of simulacra that the social is 
pushed beyond its limits to "the point where it inverts its finalities and reaches its point of 
inertia and extermination" (Fatal Strategies 10-11). This form of inertia is, however, not an 
empty void that is drained of all meaning, but a fatal site of excessive over-multiplication that 
results in a reversion or implosion of dichotomous value systems.  
Baudrillard refers to the accelerated growth of the world pushed beyond saturation point as 
hypertelic. Like a cancer, hypertely functions as a strategy to refute origins in a process of 
endless proliferation. Finality is denied by hypertelic process, whereby all value is 
exterminated in an overdetermination of forms (Fatal Strategies 13). This overdetermination 
is of the order of the hyperreal, where reality is no longer opposed to falsity, but accumulates 
to become that which is more real than real. Accordingly, Baudrillard maintains that:  
To the truer than true we will oppose the falser than false. We will not oppose the beautiful to 
the ugly, but will look for the uglier than ugly: the monstrous. We will not oppose the visible 
to the hidden, but will look for the more hidden than hidden: the secret. (Fatal Strategies 7)  
This excess of positivity is radically different to the struggle of dialectics that sees the 
beautiful oppose the ugly and the true oppose the false. Meaning is no longer a question of 
opposites, but of excesses that obliterate stable oppositions by collapsing inward. Manson 
enacts this proliferation and disappearance by exceeding the limits of the natural body.  
The centre spread of the Mechanical Animals CD sleeve notes shows Manson languidly 
outstretched out on a sofa.[3] This furniture upon which Manson reclines is grey and 
synthetic, a metallic sheen reflecting off its surface. Its tubular shape and long frame appears 
distorted and artificial, much like Manson's own plastic form. The surface of his skin and the 
surface of the sofa display the characteristics of artifice and technological construction. These 
forms appear to merge into one other, demanding that the viewer consider where the 
inanimate object ends and Manson begins. The plasticity of the two forms implies process, a 
stretching beyond the boundaries of the subject's body and the sofa object upon which 
Manson reclines. To borrow a phrase form Baudrillard, Manson appears as "more mobile than 
mobile: metamorphosis" (Fatal Strategies 7). During metamorphosis fixity and mobility are 
not opposed. Rather, the play of surfaces disturbs the distinction between subject and object.  
Manson's metamorphosis into a mechanical animal is made possible through the fatality of 
reversion, whereby his skin pushes beyond its limits, imploding in on itself to annihilate the 
difference between subject and object, and the structure of signification that differentiates the 
two. It is this process of implosion that ensures Manson's plastic body eludes rupture. His 
taut, plastic mould indicates containment and flexibility. His elongated limbs and distended 
fingers further signal an elasticity that threatens to morph, mutate and shift into something 
else, yet never rupture. Absolute fragmentation of the subject is made impossible by fatality, 
which ensures the subject disappears at its limit point. The subject does not explode outward, 
but disappears; its form reverses inward in an act of metamorphosis that produces something 
else. 
Manson's skin can therefore no longer function as a boundary site that differentiates self from 
Other, nature from technology, and the organic from the artificial. Instead, skin signals the 
point of transformation and liminality where self becomes Other, nature fuses with 
technology and the organic cannot be discerned from artifice. Judith Halberstam has written 
of skin as "at once the most fragile of boundaries and the most stable of signifiers; it is the site 
of entry for the vampire, the signifier of race for the nineteenth-century monster. Skin is 
precisely what does not fit" (163). In a discussion of Jonathan Demme's 1991 film The Silence 
of the Lambs, Halberstam argues that contemporary images of the monster locate horror at the 
level of the skin, thereby disrupting the established gothic model of horror as one of surface 
and depth. Referring to several scenes in the film, Halberstam illustrates how skin functions 
to confuse boundaries such as interior and exterior, consumption and being consumed, male 
and female. What ensues, she argues, is a construction of a posthuman gender founded upon 
mis-identity that remakes gender and the humanistic assumptions upon which identity is 
forged (176-177). 
Similarly, Manson's emphasis upon his plasticity of form suggests that he exists only as 
surface, as a simulation without any relation to the real. Manson's grey and pasty form is a 
flesh that is made synthetic, digitally altered to produce the effect of a plasticine-moulded 
construct. The function of skin as a boundary between biological interiorities and the external 
invasions of technology is thus rendered obsolete. No longer is the technological/human 
interaction configured in terms of a prosthetic extension or invasion of the unified and organic 
self by technology. Instead, posthuman configurations contest the separation of the organic 
and machinic, the human and non-human in favour of a symbiotic and contaminated 
interaction whereby interiorities and exteriorities, self and Other, no longer exist. As Manson 
proliferates, both in terms of digital image reproduction, and the elasticity and endless 
possibilities of the body, he surpasses the finalities of binary oppositions to reside beyond the 
fixity of signifying practice. Indeed, Manson is that which Halberstam says "does not fit"; that 
which goes beyond established categories of gendered identity. 
Manson's plastic skin also poses a challenge to binary hierarchies of race. Traditionally, skin 
was interpreted as "a reflection of the inside" or "mirror of the soul" (Benthien ix), hence the 
site of identity and selfhood. Racial and ethnic identity, too, was located at the site of the skin, 
rendering non-white skin an anomaly, an Other to the dominant, white norm (Gilman 1985). 
Yet there is nothing authentic or natural about Manson's pliable surface. The plasticity of his 
skin emphasises the constructed nature of racial difference in terms of skin colour. His skin is 
too plastic and shiny to pass as normal. In parts it is whiter-than-white, with an unnatural 
glow that exposes whiteness not as a given but a construct. His contours are grey and 
metallic, evoking the artifice of the machine. By suggesting that the body's surface is a 
product of technological intervention, Manson makes us aware of race as culturally and 
historically constructed, rather than a biological given. What we are being asked to consume 
is not necessarily a homogenised difference that erases racial specificity, but a posthuman 
imagining that speculates upon the role of information and biotechnologies in the constitution 
of identity and selfhood. 
Manson proves disturbing because he destabilizes a coherent identity that is structured in a 
binaristic system of meaning determining gender and race and the natural, originary, and 
human. Unlike the monster, which functions simultaneously to destabilize and legitimate 
human identity, Manson destroys systems of value by exceeding the limits of the body and 
signifying practice, and the possibility of forging an identity predicated upon self/Other 
relations. Manson exhibits a plasticity of form that emphasizes fluidity and malleability. His 
skin stretches over his frame to cover and contain his interior elements. This artificial skin, 
like plasticine, begs to be moulded, disrupted, reformed. The processes of repetition and 
reproduction evoked by plastic as a substance of artifice, imitation, and inauthenticity 
(Barthes 97-98) are evidenced in the figure of Manson. Constituted by plastic, a substance of 
transformation and simulation, Manson contests an interpretation of subjectivity as fixed, 
essential and originary. Instead his transformative state scrambles the binary codes structuring 
conventional notions of identity. 
The contrived moulding and casting of Manson's greying form is devoid of the inversions and 
extensions of the body that rupture the seamlessness of the skin's surface and indicate the 
threat of abjection. There is no sign of leaking nipples, coarse hair, the vagina dentata or the 
umbilical remnant of birth - markers most commonly associated with femininity, corporeality, 
and the threat of otherness (Creed 1993). Moreover, without an umbilicus, Manson explicitly 
rejects the maternal and denies the process of birth. The most prevalent criticism to emerge 
from the associations among reproduction, technology and feminine is the suggestion that 
technology displaces the maternal, an argument sustained by Braidotti in her study of monster 
discourse (Nomadic Subjects). Zoe Sofia, writing in the context of cybernetic technologies, 
also upholds this position by suggesting that the erasure of the female body in cyberspace 
signals a flight from the material and maternal conditions of bodily experience (16). What is 
problematic about this approach is its enforcement of the long-standing construction of 
technology as masculine, contra the feminine and the natural. In this schema, technoscience 
and cybertechnologies are masculinist pursuits that control the natural, maternal, and 
feminine. Manson disturbs such readings by complicating the distinctions between nature and 
artifice, blurring the point between where the body ends and technology begins. Rather than 
re-inscribe the myth of technology as erasing the body in favour of the abstract information of 
the machine, Manson plays with the notion of origins in an age where the involvements of 
medical technologies in the birthing and reproductive processes are commonplace. Like the 
cyborg before him, Manson reminds us that a state of nature contra the artificial is fast 
collapsing. 
Manson eludes such limitations by contesting the idea that bodily markers construct gender. 
His barely-discernible breasts and ambiguous genital bulge defy the natural order. These 
amorphous grey lumps suggest that Manson is no androgene, but a more complex figuration 
than either male or female. Manson's sexually indeterminate status destabilizes identity 
predicated upon the oppositional dualisms of "man" or "woman." Rather, the transexuality 
displayed by Manson exemplifies the excessive proliferation of the signs of sex within media 
culture. According to Baudrillard, transexuality is a mode of play between the signs of sex - a 
negotiation of sexual indifference that inverts the established play upon sexual difference and 
its foundation in pleasure (The Transparency of Evil). Sexual indifference focuses "on lack of 
differentiation between the sexual poles, and on indifference to sex qua pleasure" 
(Transparency 20). Baudrillard cites Andy Warhol, Michael Jackson, and La Cicciolina as 
examples of a sexual ambiguity; a lack of gender specificity "where sexuality is lost in the 
theatrical excess of its ambiguity" (Transparency 22). Sexual indifference is everywhere. The 
proliferation of sex has ensured its disappearance. 
To interpret Manson as simply negating gender difference, however, is to bypass the key 
dimension of the technological in reshaping the very status of the human. I argue that 
Manson's potency for refiguring a feminist politics of the subject lies not in the negation of 
sexuality, but in the opening up of difference beyond binary dualisms. Sexual status is not 
denied, but becomes a proliferation of possibilities generated by the posthuman condition. 
Anatomical being is thus no longer a stable referent as Manson's sexual markers exceed the 
limits of the natural body. By blurring the corporeal signifiers of gender in a context of digital 
simulation, Manson not only problematizes gendered difference but the very status of the 
body and embodied reality as the sites where identity resides. Gender, like skin, is a surface 
effect, rather than a marker of identity locatable in the body. By confusing his status as man 
or woman, machine or organism, Manson defies categorization in a regime of binary 
difference. Difference, as a marker of sexual, racial, and ethnic identity, is under attack. 
Manson functions as a fatal site, a place of unstable signification that cannot be contained 
within an economy of exchange that relies upon the dualistic nature of difference. The move 
toward a multiplicity of subjectivities and bodily experiences is instigated by the interactions 
between the organic and the technological. No longer the source of the authentic or natural, 
the shifting boundaries of the corporeal in turn refigure sexuality, race, and gender as fluid 
and displaced terms. Manson opts for a skin that is neither male nor female, neither organic 
nor technological, but something new that refutes essentialist notions of the body and the 
natural, occasioning a range of possibilities for what might constitute subjectivity beyond the 
limits of the body and identity. The sexual ambivalence displayed by Manson ruptures 
semiotic order, so that coherent meaning is not only challenged, but made impossible. For 
Baudrillard, this fatal strategy is a catastrophic process. 
Baudrillard's notion of catastrophe allows us to re-conceive the relations of reality against 
representation, and subject versus object, upon which a politics of identity depends. 
Subjectivity eludes definition within a self/Other dichotomy, becoming instead a process of 
disappearance, catastrophe, and fatality. Moreover, configuring the subject as catastrophic 
contests a Marxist-inspired model of the resisting subject. Understanding the subject as 
resistant to popular culture is a strategy that secures identity counter to particular aspects of 
culture. In this schema, subjects and objects remain firmly opposed. Catastrophe, on the other 
hand, operates to ensure identity's disappearance within the acceleration and proliferation of 
popular cultural signs and artefacts. 
How, then, might the question of difference be negotiated in an order of simulation where 
difference is erased? Vivian Sobchack's work on digital morphing provides a contemporary 
point of engagement to pursue the question of difference in relation to figurations of the 
transformative. Manson's status as a digital image, and his plastic skin, suggest a reversibility 
and fluidity of form akin to the virtual morph generated in digital space. While it is 
impossible to witness Manson change over time on a CD cover, the potential for Manson to 
morph resides in his status as a digital image. Sobchack considers "implied reversibility" a 
key feature of the morph, stating that "(w)hether or not one actually sees the reversal is 
irrelevant to the 'lived' knowledge of its possibility" ("Meta-Morphing" 44). By situating the 
morph within a broader genealogy of mythology, magic, "trick" films, and attractions, 
Sobchack invites the reader to consider the digital morph's "continuities and discontinuities 
with earlier forms and figures of 'marvelous' transformation" (Meta-Morphing xv). Indeed, 
the strength of the essays in her edited collection on digital morphing, Meta-Morphing: Visual 
Transformation and the Culture of Quick Change, lies in their awareness of the historical 
formation of the transformative figuration before the advent of digital technologies. 
In her own contribution to Meta-Morphing, Sobchack turns her attention to the erasure of 
difference as a crucial marker of identity in contemporary instances of digital morphing. Her 
essay "'At the Still Point of the Turning World': Meta-Morphing and Meta-Stasis" suggests 
that the digital morph circulates in popular culture as a figure that is banal and familiar, but 
also as a site of fascination and impossibility (131-132). Sobchack in part celebrates the 
uncanny and paradoxical qualities of the morph, arguing that:  
It calls to the part of us that escapes our perceived sense of our 'selves' and partakes in the 
flux and ceaseless becoming of Being - that is, our bodies at the cellular level ceaselessly 
forming and reforming and not 'ourselves' at all. (“‘At the Still Point’”136) 
Morphing taps into our own sense of being a subject in flux. Sobchack claims, however, that 
the material experience of space and time is rendered problematic by the digital morph's 
"quick-change" qualities and powers of reversibility. Sobchack is particularly critical of the 
manner by which the morph functions to assimilate difference and Otherness into a figure of 
the same. Taking Michael Jackson's "Black or White" videoclip as one of her examples, 
Sobchack maintains that while Otherness is purportedly celebrated in the parade of multi-
ethnic and racial faces, it is concurrently denied by the morphing of one face into another 
("'At the Still Point'"139). And while difference is conventionally understood in terms of 
binary hierarchies, whereby man is privileged over woman, black over white and self over 
Other, Sobchack suggests that the reversibility of the morph denies the power relations upon 
which difference relies, presenting the myth of equality and the democratisation of difference. 
Moreover, according to Sobchack, reversibility denies the spatiality and temporality of lived 
existence in which difference operates ("'At the Still Point'"141-142).  
Such a homogenisation of the heterogeneity of difference in the space of popular cultural 
consumption is also found in the advertising of Italian fashion company Benetton. As 
explained by Henry Giroux, mass advertising adopts a legitimising function in order to 
"disguise the political nature of everyday life and appropriate the vulnerable new terrain of 
insurgent differences in the interests of a crass consumerism" (6). The threat of difference 
risks destabilizing the unity of white, Western masculinity, thus difference is diffused into 
sameness, and denied political efficacy. According to Giroux, Benetton negotiates difference 
via a "strategy of containment," whereby the potential antagonisms of difference are marketed 
in such a way that differences are dissolved into a depoliticised pluralism that invokes a myth 
of global harmony.  
As a "digital morph" or techno-mediated mutation, Manson could be interpreted within such a 
framework. Barthes' understanding of myth as "depoliticised speech" lends itself to a reading 
of Manson as an image that reinforces or naturalizes meaning in a repetitive process of 
endless signification (143). His form appears decontexualized; space and time fall away as 
Manson hovers against a nondescript grey backdrop that gives no indication of his spatial and 
temporal co-ordinates. His body denies any definitive markers of sexual and racial difference. 
He shuns adornment or decoration. The body is not natural, not harmonious. Rather, like the 
preying mantis of Surrealist iconography, Manson's stick-like form is repellant, posing the 
threat of envelopment by his spindly limbs. The very same figuration simultaneously emits a 
seductive synthetic sheen from his rubbery form, eliciting an evocative and playful response 
to the body. Fact and fiction fuse when attempting to make sense of the image. And it is this 
ambivalence that complicates an analysis of difference in the posthuman figuration. Beyond 
signification, difference is dispersed, annihilated, and opened up, so that identity is not 
enforced but destroyed. 
Traditionally, the potential threat of difference is contained in a mode of signification based 
upon a dualism of self/Other, whereby radical alterity is denied and negated. Braidotti's 
analysis of monster discourse, Sobchack's study of the digital morph, and Giroux's critique of 
Benetton, all expose difference as functioning in a binary dialectic. Even though difference in 
these instances is negated, it still operates via a model of dualistic structures of value. Each 
example highlights the inability of difference to be conceptualised outside the dominant 
regime of dialectical thinking, stressing how it is absorbed and contained in a model of the 
self/same. Accordingly, difference in a system predicated upon binary dualisms allays the 
threat of the Other, because this type of difference may be controlled and knowable. How 
might difference be otherwise negotiated at the site of representation, so as to configure the 
posthuman not as the denial of difference, but as a catastrophe and illusion that moves beyond 
signifying practice? 
Challenging the signifying codes that construct subjectivity, language, and culture offers the 
possibility to think about difference in another way. The articulation of difference as an 
oppositional posturing between self and Other, reality and representation, is rethought in the 
Manson figuration. Beyond dialectics, difference functions as an ongoing process of mutation 
that acknowledges the experiences of individual bodies to various technologies, re-writing 
how bodies are conceived, experienced, and represented. Manson embodies a difference that 
exceeds binary dualisms, threatening how we know the world and make meaning. For a 
difference that resides beyond signification or systems of value is no longer positioned as 
Other to a primary term. Rather, difference is annihilated so that it cannot be understood as 
different to something. It is same. 
As I have indicated in my analysis of Manson's skin and sexuality, difference escapes 
containment and homogenisation by exceeding signification. The illuminating red glow of 
Manson's stare provides another illustration of the play of difference that disturbs dialectics. 
Manson is certainly no innocent, no random anomaly produced by the freak mutation of 
genetic material occurring naturally in the gene pool. Eyes like infra-red lasers are 
reminiscent of the penetrating gaze of the disembodied lens of science, mimicking the all-
seeing gaze of the visual technologies employed by science and the military. Science and 
medicine have been understood by Michel Foucault in terms of biopower, in which an 
analytical, neutral, and objective gaze fixes and regulates knowledges. For Foucault, visual 
control is a form of power deployed in the service of knowledge making practices. 
In the tradition of the monster, Manson challenges the scientific rationale of order, 
classification and naming. His burning stare "sees through" an overarching biotechnological 
narrative of a new world order, refusing to comply with a seamless and controlled vision of a 
technological future. Donna Haraway has theorized the "New World Order, Inc." as an 
imaginary configuration, a way of understanding the global arrangement of culture and capital 
precipitated by information technologies and technoscience (Modest_Witness 6-7). Haraway's 
critique of the term functions along the lines of ideology-effects, whereby representations 
both construct and reflect a contemporary cultural landscape. In the instance of posthuman 
figurations, it is in a world of biological, informational, and digital technologies that these 
representations are operative. I contest an interpretation of posthuman figurations that rely 
upon semiotic meaning production and ideology effects. Posthuman figurations do not wholly 
operate as a reflection of who we are, or function to define what we are not. Rather, they 
circulate beyond the fixity of signifying codes, in a space of simulation that calls into question 
conventional understandings of subjectivity, the body, and reality. 
Manson poses as an ominous and potentially dangerous mutant monster that threatens to 
transform the coding of technology as either threat to, or saviour of, humanity. Manson 
illustrates the fear and mistrust evoked by the controlling gaze of science "tampering" with 
humanity, while turning the gaze back upon the institutional structures that strive to fix 
meaning: to name, know, and order the world. He is both watcher and watched, confusing the 
boundaries that traditionally serve as a limit point between self and Other. The 
interconnections and interfaces of the techno-human interaction belie simplistic distinctions, 
making it impossible to judge the effects of biotechnology as either good or bad. 
Manson's infra-red eyes are no window to the soul. The viewer is not welcome to gaze into 
them. Confronting the viewer is a laser-like stare that mimics the scanning devices of military 
technology, or the spaces of consumption - the beep of the supermarket scanner. As 
perception is made technological, Manson evokes the machine as an aspect of the self (Turkle 
1980). He confuses the distinction between bodily interiorities and machinic exteriorities so 
that the machine becomes an integral dimension of embodiment. Manson resists signification 
as an inert and "safe" product of biotechnology by simultaneously occupying the position of 
the body threatened by the scientific gaze, and a body that exceeds the empiricism of the 
scientific paradigm. Manson signals more than the threat of the Other, or the postmodern 
subject in crisis.  
Posthuman bodies demand another kind of engagement with difference, a negotiation that 
eludes binary opposition. The ambivalence of Manson's skin, his sexuality, and his stare, play 
with difference in a way that goes beyond dialectics. Manson is, at once, appealing and 
repulsive, seductive and threatening. It is this ambivalence that underpins figurations of the 
posthuman, a point of slippage that corrupts an understanding of representation as a mirror of 
reality. Manson shows us that in an order of simulation, the image can be neither. The image 
functions instead as a catastrophic site that challenges hierarchical and dualistic value systems 
through the excess of the simulacra. 
A focus upon difference and its function within a political economy of signification is 
fundamental to understanding what is at stake for women in a post-material, post-gender, and 
posthuman landscape. As a sexually indeterminate, technologically mediated entity, Manson 
destabilizes the Cartesian dualisms that underpin the liberal-humanist subject, as well as a 
notion of female identity predicated upon positive difference. Against the centrality of the 
subject, Manson's catastrophic posthuman form encourages a decentralized mode of figuring 
subjectivity. In this sense, posthuman figurations do not pose as objects or subjects unto 
themselves, but act as fatal sites that displace the value system upon which subjects and 
objects are constructed in relation to one another. In the process of reversion, the possibility 
of coherent meaning is denied. The potential of this mode of theorizing for feminism may be 
located at the point where the logic of dualistic thinking is exceeded, where disappearance 
enables formulations of embodied existence beyond male/female, self/Other, and 
technology/nature. Following this schema, subjectivity forged upon identification with the 
posthuman is made impossible. Manson's is not a productive difference, as found in the 
monstrous hybrids reclaimed by feminism to disrupt the rational order. Rather, subjectivity is 
understood as a series of displacements where identity cannot be secured in relation to 
popular images in terms of identification or resistance. Identity is abolished by posthuman 
figurations in favour of a model of the subject that is unstable, transformative, and 
catastrophic. 
 
Notes 
1 See image online here (from http://www.ilbaluardo.com/). back  
2 The argument I present here is specific to the images accompanying the Mechanical 
Animals CD and does not necessarily extend to the other images of and by Manson circulating 
in the popular media. This album follows in the tradition of what Mark Dery has identified as 
"metal machine music" - a mainstreaming of the once alternative genres of hardcore and 
electro-industrial rock that  
serves as a prism to refract some of cyberculture's recurrent themes: the convergence of 
human and machine; the supersession of sensory experience by digital simulation; the 
subcultural 'misuse' of high technology in the service of perverse sensibilities or subversive 
ideologies; and a profound ambivalence, handed down from the sixties, toward computers as 
engines of liberation and tools of social control, reweavers of the social fabric shredded by 
industrial modernism and instruments of an ever greater atomization. (75)  
Some of these ideas will be developed in this paper in relation to gender, technology, and the 
erasure of difference. It is also important to approach this image with the knowledge that 
Manson's shocking and provocative music, personas, and imagery are a deliberate 
intervention into debates regarding media and censorship. Documentary film-maker Mike 
Moore's interview with Manson in Bowling For Columbine is a recent and accessible example 
of Mason's position on free speech and censorship debates. back  
3 See http://www.mansonusa.com/img/?src=/photo/promo/98-99/71.jpg back  
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